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Abstract: Many political theorists argue that immigration restrictions are unjust
and defend broadly open borders. In this paper, I examine the implications of
this view for individual conduct. In particular, I argue that the citizens of states
that enforce unjust immigration restrictions have duties to disobey certain
immigration laws. States conscript their citizens to help enforce immigration
law by imposing legal duties on these citizens to monitor, report, and refrain
from interacting with unauthorized migrants. If an ideal of open borders is true,
these laws are unjust. Furthermore, if citizens comply with their legal duties,
they contribute to violating the rights of migrants. We are obligated to refrain
from contributing to rights-violations. So, citizens are obligated to disobey
immigration laws. I defend the moral requirement to disobey immigration laws
against the objection that disobedience to the law is excessively risky and the
objection that citizens have political obligations to obey the law.
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1 Introduction
Many people believe that immigration restrictions are morally permissible. They
think that states have rights to exclude foreigners and deport them from their
territories. This view is reflected in public opinion and policy. Most states
heavily restrict immigration and these immigration restrictions are often popu-
lar. But the conventional wisdom about the permissibility of immigration restric-
tions might be wrong. A growing number of philosophers and social scientists
defend open borders.1 They argue that immigration restrictions unjustly interfere
with individual liberty and reinforce global poverty. Defenders of open immigra-
tion contend that the reasons in favor of immigration restrictions fail to
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1 For instance, see: Carens (2013, ch. 11), Huemer (2010), Kukathas (2014), Caplan and Naik
(2015), Oberman (2016).
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outweigh the moral reasons in favor of free international movement. I will refer
to the view that immigration restrictions are generally unjust as the revisionary
view. I have defended the revisionary view elsewhere (Hidalgo 2014).
Advocates of the revisionary view have focused almost entirely on public
policy. They have argued at length that states are obligated to implement
policies that permit more immigration. Yet adherents of the revisionary view
have neglected to consider whether their view matters for individual ethics. Does
the ideal of open borders have any implications for the obligations of individual
citizens? This question acquires a special urgency if open borders turn out to be
politically infeasible. Many observers, including people who endorse the revi-
sionary view, agree that free international movement is politically untenable
because most people reject open borders. Joseph Carens, the leading philoso-
phical defender of open borders, concedes that open borders are “utopian…
under current conditions” (2013, p. 296) and Chandran Kukathas argues in favor
of open borders while acknowledging that free migration is “entirely infeasible”
(2014, p. 387). But, even if open borders are infeasible at the level of public
policy, the ideal of open borders could matter for individual conduct. The truth
of the revisionary view may affect how we ought to live our lives.
In this paper, I will argue that, if immigration restrictions are generally
unjust, then the citizens of states that enforce these restrictions have duties to
disobey the law. My argument goes like this. To an increasing extent, states are
conscripting citizens to enforce immigration law by imposing legal duties on
them to monitor, report, and refrain from interacting with unauthorized
migrants. If the revisionary view is true, then these laws are unjust. If citizens
comply with their legal duties, they contribute to violating the rights of
migrants. We are obligated to refrain from contributing to rights-violations. So,
citizens are obligated to disobey immigration laws. I have organized my argu-
ment as follows. In Section 2, I will explain why I believe that the revisionary
view is true. In Section 3, I will argue that citizens have duties to disobey
immigration law in order to avoid complicity in injustice. In Section 4, I will
respond to the objection that resistance to immigration law is excessively risky
and the objection that citizens have duties to obey the law. Section 5 concludes.
2 The revisionary view
In this section, I will briefly sketch the case for the revisionary view. To be clear,
I will refrain from defending the ideal of open borders against critics. Political
theorists have advanced important arguments for immigration restrictions and
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I will avoid trying to show these arguments are unsound here. My aim is merely
to explain some of the reasons why I find the revisionary view to be compelling.
One influential argument for open immigration appeals to the value of
freedom of movement.2 Restrictions on freedom of movement interfere with
freedom of association, freedom of occupational choice, and other valuable
liberties. Here is an illustration. Suppose that Linda lives in Chicago and she
wants to move to Los Angeles. Employers in Los Angeles are willing to hire
Linda and Linda has friends and family in Los Angeles who want to live near
her. But government officials decide that they will coercively stop the residents
of Chicago from moving to Los Angeles. State employees physically prevent
Linda from reaching her destination and they will force her to return to Chicago
if they find her in Los Angeles.3 Most people would regard this restriction on the
freedom to move within the territory of the United States to be unjust. In
restricting Linda’s freedom of movement, public officials infringe on her freedom
to associate with friends and family, pursue the occupation of her choice,
explore cultural opportunities that are more accessible in Los Angeles, and
advance other personal projects that require moving. State officials have weighty
moral reasons to respect these freedoms. Thus, officials have strong reasons to
avoid restricting Linda’s freedom of movement within their state’s territory.
Yet the value of freedom of movement also grounds a powerful objection to
immigration restrictions. Take Linda’s case again, but let’s change some details.
Imagine that Linda wants to move to London instead of Los Angeles. Assume
that people in London would want to associate with Linda if she lived there,
employers would be willing to hire her, and so on. If state officials prevented
Linda from immigrating, then these officials would interfere with Linda’s free-
doms along with the freedoms of Britain’s citizens to interact with Linda.
Perhaps the British government can permissibly make Linda wait for a period
of time before granting her citizenship and access to social welfare programs.
But the revisionary view says that it would be unjust for the British government
to deny Linda the freedom to immigrate and permanently reside in its territory.
The point applies more generally. When a state restricts immigration, this state
forbids foreigners from accepting employment from its citizens or associating
with its citizens on their own freely chosen terms. There are weighty moral
reasons against immigration restrictions in virtue of the fact that these restric-
tions interfere with valuable liberties.
2 Versions of this argument can be found in Carens (2013), Kukathas (2014), and Oberman
(2016).
3 Freiman and Hidalgo (2016, pp. 4–6) describe a similar case in arguing that immigration
restrictions infringe on valuable freedoms.
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So, adherents of the revisionary view think that there is a presumption in
favor of freedom of movement. Yet they acknowledge that this presumption can
be overridden. In particular, it is plausible that the reasons to respect valuable
liberties can be outweighed when interfering with these liberties is necessary to
protect against grave harm. For this reason, adherents of the revisionary view
concede that immigration restrictions are permissible when they prevent suffi-
ciently bad outcomes from occurring (Carens 1987, pp. 260–2; Huemer 2010,
pp. 450–4; Oberman 2016, pp. 45–50). Suppose that, if a state immediately
abolished its immigration restrictions and opened its borders to foreigners,
this would bring about dire consequences. Assume that open borders would
cause massive overcrowding, severe environmental damage, widespread ethnic
conflict, and other harms. If open borders facilitated serious harms, then the
moral reasons in favor of restricting immigration may override the reasons in
favor of free immigration.
But defenders of the revisionary view say that it is unlikely that most actual
immigration restrictions are permissible. Contemporary immigration laws are
extremely restrictive. Immigration restrictions may stop hundreds of millions
of people from moving to other states.4 Many people would be able to escape
severe poverty, violence, oppression, and other bad conditions if states per-
mitted more immigration. States also routinely deport a large number of
migrants, such as unauthorized migrants and failed asylum-seekers. It is doubt-
ful whether these policies have benefits that are sufficient to justify the harms
that they inflict on migrants.5 Perhaps there is some risk that abolishing immi-
gration restrictions would cause grave harms and that we should take precau-
tions to mitigate this risk. It only follows from this that states should gradually
open their borders. States might permit more immigration every year until
everyone who wants to immigrate can do so or we begin to observe seriously
harmful outcomes.6 So, while adherents of the revisionary view acknowledge
that some immigration restrictions are conceivably permissible, they conclude
that actual immigration restrictions are generally unjust and that states should
begin dismantling them.
4 For an estimate of how many people would immigrate under open borders, see: Pritchett
(2006, pp. 68–72).
5 Although it is hard to know what would happen if states suddenly opened their borders, we
do have experience with cases in which states received large and rapid influxes of immigrants.
Some social scientists argue that even sizable and rapid increases in immigration have few
negative effects on net (Fetzer 2016).
6 Michael Huemer makes this suggestion (2010, pp. 452–4).
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To sum up, my view and the view of other advocates of open immigration is
that states have duties to respect individual liberty and these duties require that
states abolish their immigration restrictions. Even if some immigration restric-
tions can be justified in rare cases, most existent immigration restrictions are
likely impermissible. I will assume that the revisionary view is true for the
remainder of this paper.
3 Justifying the duty to disobey
I will now argue that, if the revisionary view is true, then citizens have duties to
disobey immigration laws that regulate how citizens and migrants interact with
each other. My argument begins with the observation that, when states restrict
immigration in practice, they do more than authorize state employees to exclude
and deport foreigners. States also conscript their citizens to help enforce their
immigration restrictions. Governments impose legal duties on citizens to deny
unauthorized migrants access to employment, housing, and other benefits, and
to monitor migrants in order to ensure that they comply with immigration laws.
Here are some examples of laws that enlist citizens in restricting
immigration:
(i) Most affluent democracies have laws that prohibit employers from know-
ingly hiring unauthorized migrants. Employers are often required to
determine the immigration status of applicants before they consider
them for employment and to fire workers if employers discover that they
are unauthorized migrants (European Union Agency for Fundamental
Rights 2014).
(ii) Many jurisdictions forbid private citizens from harboring unauthorized
migrants. This means that landlords are prohibited from renting housing
to these migrants and may be required to evict tenants if they turn out to
be unauthorized migrants (Pham 2008, pp. 792–3). Certain governments
have penalized private citizens for providing any form of shelter to
unauthorized migrants (Jain 2010).
(iii) Banks in Britain are required to check the immigration status of customers
and deny access to bank accounts to people who are unable to prove their
regular status (Aliverti 2015).
(iv) Companies in the United States and most of Europe are forbidden from
transporting unauthorized migrants and sometimes need to screen their
passengers to satisfy this requirement (Guiraudon 2006). For example, it is
illegal for airlines to fly migrants across borders if they lack the proper
The Duty to Disobey Immigration Law 5
 - 10.1515/mopp-2015-0031
Downloaded from PubFactory at 08/22/2016 02:26:37PM by hidalgoj@gmail.com
via University of Richmond and Javier Hidalgo
documentation and busing companies may be obligated to refuse to sell
tickets to anyone that they know or believe to be an illegal alien (Pham
2008, p. 778).
(v) States now compel government employees that were formerly uninvolved
in immigration enforcement to monitor and report migrants to immigra-
tion agents. Universities in the United Kingdom must monitor the immi-
gration status of their students and report them to the government if they
miss more than ten consecutive working days (Walsh 2014, p. 245).
Registrars are also obliged to report “sham” marriages to immigration
agents if they suspect that people are getting married solely in order to
secure residency in a country. Some jurisdictions in the United States
require police officers to report unauthorized migrants to immigration
agents.
For ease of reference, I will refer to laws like (i-v) that impose legal obligations
on citizens to monitor, report, or refrain from interacting with unauthorized
migrants as interaction restrictions.
Interaction restrictions are hard to justify if the revisionary view is true.
Interaction restrictions are morally problematic in part because they infringe on
the liberties of citizens. Yet the primary burden of interaction restrictions gen-
erally falls on unauthorized migrants. While interaction restrictions constrain
the freedom of some citizens to some extent, these laws aim to entirely curtail
some of the basic liberties of migrants, such as their freedom of occupational
choice. So, the main reason why interaction restrictions are unjust is that they
violate the rights of migrants. To explain this claim, I want to first make a more
general observation about how states can violate rights. States can violate rights
in at least two different ways. First, states can violate rights by prohibiting
rights-holders from engaging in the activities that are protected by their rights.
Second, states can forbid other people from cooperating with rights-holders to
perform the actions that are protected by these rights.
Here is an example to illustrate. Suppose that the government forbids you
from publishing a book that is critical of the government’s policies. Imagine that
the government threatens you with punishment if you try to publish this book.
Obviously, the state violates your right to free speech in this case. You have a
claim-right against government interference with your speech. That is, the state
is under a duty to refrain from interfering with your ability to publish your book.
But the government can violate your right to free speech in another way. The
government can violate your rights by prohibiting other people from publishing
your book. Imagine that you lack the funds to publish your book on your own
and that public officials threaten other people with punishment if they attempt
6 J. S. Hidalgo
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to publish your book, although the government will refrain from punishing you
for publishing your book. In this example, the state violates your right to free
speech even though the state avoids punishing you for exercising this right.
This example suggests that the following general principle is true: if
person A has a claim-right to perform some action against agent B and
A can only perform this action if some other person C voluntarily cooperates
with A, then A has a right that B refrain from coercively preventing C from
cooperating with A to perform this action. Let’s call this: the cooperation
principle. The cooperation principle can explain how the government can
violate your right to free speech despite the fact that the government avoids
punishing you for your speech. Your right to free speech means that you have
a right against the government’s efforts to stop other people from cooperating
with you to exercise this right.
The cooperation principle helps clarify why interaction restrictions are
unjust as well. As I noted in Section 2, immigration restrictions are objectionable
because they interfere with occupational freedom, freedom of association, and
other important liberties. The same considerations that justify rights to immi-
grate to a state also explain why people have rights to exercise freedom of
association and occupational choice in this state. If immigration restrictions
are generally unjust, then unauthorized migrants have moral rights to exercise
these freedoms in the states where they reside. After all, unauthorized migrants
had moral rights to immigrate in the first place, but governments simply failed
to respect their rights and they were forced to immigrate without official permis-
sion. Yet the existence of moral rights doesn’t depend on the government’s
authorization.
If unauthorized migrants have rights to occupational freedom and freedom
of association, then the cooperation principle implies that they have rights
against the state’s attempts to coercively forbid other people from cooperating
with migrants in order to exercise these rights. Interaction restrictions forbid
employers from hiring unauthorized migrants, landlords from renting to them,
companies from transporting them, and so on. These laws violate the rights of
unauthorized migrants to occupational choice, freedom of contract and associa-
tion, and perhaps other rights as well. If a law violates rights, then this is a
strong reason to believe that this law is unjustified. Nonetheless, a law that
violates rights may be all-things-considered justified if this law has a strong
countervailing rationale. For example, it may be permissible to infringe on rights
if doing so brings about a sufficiently good outcome. But it seems unlikely that
interaction restrictions have a justification that is strong enough to outweigh the
reasons to respect the rights of migrants. To explain why, let’s briefly consider
some possible justifications for interaction restrictions.
The Duty to Disobey Immigration Law 7
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Advocates of interaction restrictions argue that these laws are necessary to
deter immigration and persuade migrants to leave. People often want to immi-
grate to find work. If states forbid employers from hiring unauthorized migrants,
then foreigners will have less incentive to immigrate without authorization.
States want unauthorized migrants to return home as well. Interaction restric-
tions raise the costs of residing in a territory and encourage migrants to leave the
country. These laws also aim to protect citizens from competition from migrants
in the housing and labor markets. Interaction restrictions penalize interactions
that benefit unauthorized migrants and give employers and landlords incentives
to benefit native citizens instead. Finally, some policymakers believe that certain
interaction restrictions are necessary to prevent citizens from gaining unfair
competitive advantages by interacting with unauthorized migrants (Pham
2008, p. 801). Businesses may gain a competitive advantage over other firms
by violating the law and hiring unauthorized migrants. Employer sanctions
attempt to stop businesses from securing these advantages.
These justifications for interaction restrictions crumble if the revisionary
view is true. It is false that deterring immigration and compelling migrants to
exit are morally desirable aims. If states lack rights to exclude outsiders in the
first place, then states lack rights to use coercive measures to deter them from
immigrating or to encourage them to leave. The same goes for the goal of
protecting citizens from competition for jobs and housing. Advocates of the
revisionary view argue that it is unjust for states to restrict the liberties of
foreigners in order to insulate their citizens from competition.7 States’ duties to
respect the valuable liberties of foreigners typically defeat the moral reasons to
secure economic benefits for their citizens. In addition, we should reject the view
that it is unfair for businesses to hire people who have the right to work in a
state. Perhaps the suggestion is that it is unfair for businesses to gain advan-
tages over others by breaking the law. However, it only appears to be unfair to
gain advantages by violating immigration laws if we have antecedent obliga-
tions to comply with these laws. If my argument in this paper is correct, we lack
these obligations.
So, interaction restrictions violate rights and these laws lack good counter-
vailing justifications. Therefore, interaction restrictions are generally unjust. Yet
the injustice of interaction restrictions is transmitted through the behavior of
private citizens. For interaction restrictions to be effective, citizens must comply
with their legal obligations to report, monitor, or refrain from interacting with
migrants. Interaction restrictions will fail to achieve their intended effects if
citizens refuse to obey these requirements. For this reason, interaction
7 For instance, see: Huemer (2010, pp. 439–44).
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restrictions make citizens complicit in wrongdoing. Let’s say that a person is
complicit in wrongdoing if her actions causally facilitate the wrongdoing of
another agent.8 Governments are the agents that are attempting to violate the
rights of migrants in the cases that I have been describing. Public officials
implement the plan of restricting the liberties of these migrants by enforcing
interaction restrictions. But ordinary citizens contribute to and make the govern-
ment’s wrongdoing possible by complying with these laws. Interaction restric-
tions distribute the responsibility for violating the rights of migrants broadly
among citizens.
To illustrate how citizens contribute to violating the rights of immigrants
when they comply with interaction restrictions, consider the following case.
Imagine that Sam owns a garment factory and he is hiring new workers.
Leticia is an unauthorized migrant who is unemployed and wants a job. The
state employees threaten Sam with fines if Sam knowingly hires unauthorized
migrants. Government officials will forcibly take a small fraction of Sam’s
income if they discover that Sam has hired Leticia, although they won’t punish
Leticia if Sam hires her. Suppose that Sam hires Leticia and only later discovers
that she is an unauthorized migrant. Sam then fires Leticia in order to comply
with the law.9
Let’s assume that the state’s prohibition on employing unauthorized
migrants is unjust in this example. The cooperation principle implies that
government officials have violated Leticia’s right to occupational freedom by
forbidding employers like Sam from hiring her. But this rights-violation is only
possible because Sam complied with the government’s directives and took steps
to prevent unauthorized migrants from working in his business. Sam is not
merely culpable of an omission or failure to aid Leticia. He actively cooperates
in the state’s project of violating Leticia’s rights. Sam has strong moral reasons
to refrain from contributing to violating the rights of migrants. To avoid compli-
city in these rights-violations, he must refuse to comply with laws that require
him to dismiss Leticia and other unauthorized migrants. As a result, Sam has
moral reasons to disobey interaction restrictions. If these reasons are decisive,
then he is morally required to disobey the law.
We can extend this basic point to interaction restrictions in general. By
complying with these requirements, citizens facilitate rights-violations. Most
people accept that we have strong moral reasons to avoid causing harm or
8 I take this definition of complicity from Chiara Lepora and Robert Goodin (2015, pp. 41–2).
Lepora and Goodin refer to this kind of complicity as “complicity simpliciter.”
9 This case is realistic. Many employers fire unauthorized migrants who are workers in order to
comply with immigration laws. For example, see: Bacon (2011).
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facilitating the violation of the rights of other people. Furthermore, it can be
wrong to contribute to rights-violations even if you lack any intention of con-
tributing to wrongdoing. For instance, a weapons dealer might lack any inten-
tion to cause harm, but the weapons dealer nonetheless acts wrongly by selling
weapons to violent criminals who will predictably use these weapons to harm
other people. Similarly, citizens may lack the intention of harming migrants or
violating their rights when they comply with interaction restrictions. Perhaps
they even disapprove of these laws and only obey them grudgingly. But, when
citizens comply with interaction restrictions, they foreseeably contribute to
violating the rights of migrants and, thus, there are significant moral reasons
against this compliance.
The moral reasons to refrain from contributing to violating rights are, in
general, pro tanto. That is, we have moral reasons that speak against contribut-
ing to rights-violations, although other moral considerations can outweigh these
reasons. The strength of the reasons to abstain from contributing to rights-
violations varies depending on the importance of your contribution and the
gravity of the rights-violation at stake. Suppose that a police officer reports
unauthorized migrants to immigration authorities and this results in the depor-
tation of these migrants. There are stringent moral reasons against the police
officer’s actions. Assume that, if the officer had declined to report these
migrants, they would have avoided deportation. So, the officer’s contribution
makes a decisive difference to the outcome in which the migrants are deported.
The rights at stake are also relatively weighty ones. Rights against deportation
are surely among the most important rights that we possess and these rights
protect urgent interests, such as our interests in living with our families. By
facilitating the deportation of unauthorized migrants, the police officer contri-
butes in a major way to violating fundamental rights. These factors explain why
the officer’s actions involve grave wrongdoing.
Contrast this with another case. Imagine that the owner of a small construc-
tion business complies with the law and refuses to consider hiring any
unauthorized migrants, although some migrants want to work for this business.
This business owner contributes to violating the rights of these migrants as well,
but the contribution of this employer to rights-violations is less bad than the
police officer’s contribution. For one thing, other employers might be willing to
hire unauthorized migrants. As a result, the business owner’s decision to refrain
from hiring unauthorized migrants may make only a minor contribution to
setting back the interests of these migrants. Moreover, while unauthorized
migrants have strong interests in finding work, they often have even weightier
interests in avoiding forced deportation. So, it is plausible that the employer
contributes to violating less fundamental rights than does the police officer. If
10 J. S. Hidalgo
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so, then the business owner has weaker moral reasons to refrain from complying
with interaction restrictions in comparison with the officer. The upshot is that,
while it is pro tanto wrong to comply with interaction restrictions in general, the
seriousness of this wrongdoing depends on other factors, such as the magnitude
of citizens’ contributions and the importance of the rights that are being
violated.
To sum up, my argument for the duty to disobey immigration law goes like
this:
1. Interaction restrictions are, in general, unjust because they violate the rights
of migrants.
2. If interaction restrictions violate the rights of migrants and citizens comply
with these requirements, then citizens contribute to rights-violations.
3. It is pro tanto wrong for citizens to contribute to rights-violations.
4. So, it is pro tanto wrong for citizens to comply with interaction restrictions.
I will refer to this as the contribution argument for the duty to disobey immigra-
tion laws. If the contribution argument is sound, then we have strong moral
reasons to disobey interaction restrictions. But it is possible that these moral
reasons are overridden by other considerations. I will now examine whether
other considerations generally outweigh the moral reasons to disobey immigra-
tion law.
4 Objections
In this section, I will respond to two objections to the contribution argument.
4.1 The risk objection
One objection to the contribution argument is that disobedience to immigration
law is risky. States threaten to punish citizens who violate interaction restric-
tions. Perhaps these risks of punishment release citizens from their obligations
to disobey interaction restrictions. The thought here is that the duty to refrain
from contributing to rights-violations is sensitive to costs to the duty-bearer. If
disobedience to the law is costly because the state will punish disobedience,
then it may be permissible for citizens to obey the law. In other words, this
objection goes:
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1. If citizens disobey interaction restrictions, there is a significant risk that the
state will impose large costs on these citizens by punishing them.
2. If there is a significant risk that states will impose large costs on citizens for
disobeying interaction restrictions, then it is morally permissible for people
to comply with these requirements.
3. So, it is morally permissible for citizens to comply with interaction
restrictions.
Call this the risk objection. I will now argue that premises 1 and 2 of the risk
objection are, at least in many cases, false.
Interaction restrictions impose legal obligations on entire populations and it
is infeasible for state employees to punish more than a tiny fraction of viola-
tions. Consider employer sanctions. In the United States, only a small number of
employers pay fines for hiring unauthorized workers (Calavita 1990; Pottle
2010). One reason that many employers flout the law is that the proliferation
of counterfeit identity documents allows employers to claim that they were non-
negligently ignorant about the immigration status of their workers. The avail-
ability of this defense makes it difficult to prosecute employers for hiring
unauthorized migrants and permits many employers to escape punishment
(Massey et al. 2003, pp. 118–20).
Even when states do punish employers for hiring unauthorized migrants,
these employers frequently incur only minor fines for violating interaction
restrictions. Again, the case of the United States is illustrative. Employers in
the United States usually must pay relatively small fines for employing
unauthorized migrants and it can be difficult for the state to collect these fines
because employers have the right to dispute the penalties in administrative
courts (Pham 2008, pp. 815–16). The low probability of detection and the
minor penalties attached to violations help explain why employers hire large
numbers of unauthorized migrants in many jurisdictions. So, it is sometimes
false that citizens incur large risks of punishment by violating interaction
restrictions.
But citizens do sometimes face high risks of serious punishment if they
disobey interaction restrictions. Nonetheless, it may still be wrong to comply
with interaction restrictions. Morality can be demanding. Sometimes it is
wrong to act in a certain way even though abstaining from acting in this way
has large costs for you. Jeff McMahan gives this case: imagine that an aggres-
sor puts a gun to your head and threatens to kill you unless you kill an
innocent person (McMahan 2011, pp. 113–14). Although you face enormous
costs if you refuse to comply, it seems wrong for you to kill an innocent person
in cases like this one.
12 J. S. Hidalgo
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McMahan gives the following argument for this judgment. There is a moral
difference between doing and allowing. In particular, it is morally worse to
cause harm than to allow harm to occur. We are more responsible for the bad
outcomes that we cause to happen than the harm that we could prevent.
Consider a famous thought experiment to motivate the distinction between
doing and allowing. Suppose that a surgeon can secretly kill one healthy patient
and redistribute this patient’s organs to five other patients who are dying of
organ failure, thereby saving their lives (Thomson 1985, p. 1396). Most people
think that it is morally worse for the surgeon to kill the healthy patient than it is
to allow the five sick patients to die of organ failure.10 If commonsense judg-
ments about this and other similar cases are correct, then it seems morally worse
to cause harm than to allow it when everything else is equal.11 Now, let’s return
to McMahan’s case in which you face a choice between killing an innocent
person and dying. If you kill an innocent person, you clearly cause harm.
However, if you refuse to kill the innocent, then you allow harm to occur to
someone – yourself. If it is morally worse to cause harm than it is to allow harm,
then you are obligated to refrain from killing the innocent person even if this
costs you your life.
While McMahan’s example is obviously an extreme case, the basic structure
of McMahan’s argument can help clarify why citizens may be obligated to
disobey interaction restrictions even if this has significant costs for them.
Suppose that you are deciding whether to comply with an interaction restriction
or not. If you do comply, you do something that foreseeably contributes to
violating the rights of unauthorized migrants. Your compliance also protects
you from the risk of state punishment. Alternatively, suppose you refuse to
comply. You refrain from contributing to violating the rights of other people.
10 To be clear, the distinction between doing and allowing is not the only factor that may affect
our judgments in the surgeon case or McMahan’s example. Intentions play a role too. Your
actions are morally worse if you intend to harm an innocent person and, as McMahan points
out, this helps explain it would be wrong to kill the innocent person in the case where you must
choose between killing a bystander and death. But the distinction between doing and allowing
per se also seems to matter irrespective of an agent’s intention. Here is an example. Imagine a
runaway trolley is about to hit an innocent person who is tied to the track, but you can divert
the trolley to a sidetrack. However, there is another innocent person trapped on this sidetrack. It
seems wrong to divert the trolley in this case. In other words, it is morally worse to cause harm
to the person on the sidetrack than it is to allow harm to befall the person on the main track,
despite the fact that you don’t seem to intend to harm the person on the sidetrack. This
indicates that it is morally worse to cause harm than to allow harm even if you don’t intend
this harm.
11 The distinction between doing and allowing is controversial among philosophers. For
defenses of the moral significance of this distinction, see Quinn (1989) and Scheffler (2004).
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Yet you allow the state to impose a risk of punishment on you. If there is a
distinction between doing and allowing, then it can be worse to act in a manner
that facilitates harm to others than to allow harm to accrue to you, even if the
harm that falls on you is more severe than the harm that your actions would
impose on others. Thus, it can be wrong to comply with interaction restrictions
despite the fact that this disobedience is risky.
To illustrate, return to the case of Sam and Leticia. Recall that Sam has hired
Leticia and discovers that she is an unauthorized migrant. The law requires Sam
to fire Leticia, although suppose that Sam otherwise lacks grounds for dismiss-
ing her. Sam has two options. First, Sam could obey the law and fire Leticia.
Second, Sam could refrain from firing Leticia. If Sam takes this second option,
he would incur a risk that the government will detect his law-breaking and
impose significant fines on him.
What should Sam do? If Sam fires Leticia, he causes harm to her in the sense
that he sets back her interests in making a living and contributes to the govern-
ment’s plan of violating her rights. If Sam refuses to dismiss Leticia, then Sam
allows the government to impose a risk of penalties on him. If there are stronger
moral reasons to refrain from causing harm than to allow harm to happen, then
Sam has stronger reasons to avoid firing Leticia than he does to allow risks of
penalties to accrue to himself. This is the case even if the expected costs that
Sam would bear are greater than the expected costs that Leticia would bear if
she were fired. Assume for now that no other moral reasons bear on this case.12
It is therefore wrong for Sam to comply with the law.
To be clear, I don’t claim that it is always wrong to comply with interaction
restrictions. Although citizens have strong reasons for disobeying interaction
restrictions, these reasons can be overcome if the consequences of this dis-
obedience are sufficiently bad. Imagine that, if the government finds out that
Sam is employing unauthorized migrants, state employees will almost cer-
tainly impose large fines on Sam’s business, which would cause it to close
down and result in the unemployment of all his workers. In that case, Sam’s
moral reasons to prevent this bad outcome from occurring can plausibly over-
ride his reasons to refrain from contributing to rights-violations. In addition,
the threat of state punishment might sometimes excuse compliance with
interaction restrictions without justifying it. If states credibly threaten to
12 You might say that Sam has property rights over his business and so he can do whatever he
wants with it. But I am skeptical of the claim that, if you have a property right in something,
then it is morally permissible to use this property however you please. At any rate, I will bracket
this issue here.
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impose severe punishments on citizens who violate interaction restrictions,
then states place these citizens under duress. Duress diminishes culpability for
wrongdoing. This means that people who comply with interaction restrictions
are less blameworthy than they would otherwise be, although their actions
may still be impermissible.
4.2 The authority objection
Another objection to my argument is that citizens have obligations to obey the
law. According to some authors, citizens have duties to obey the law and these
are weighty duties that normally defeat countervailing considerations. So, if
citizens have obligations to obey the law, then these obligations might defeat
the moral reasons to disobey immigration laws. This argument goes:
1. Citizens have obligations to obey the law.
2. If citizens have obligations to obey the law, then these obligations generally
defeat the moral reasons to disobey interaction restrictions.
3. So, it is generally impermissible for citizens to disobey interaction
restrictions.
Call this the authority objection to the duty to disobey immigration law.
Many philosophers reject the first premise of the authority objection. John
Simmons (1979), Michael Huemer (2012), and other philosophers argue that we
should reject the view that we have content-independent duties to obey the law
because all arguments for these duties are unsound. But, even if we accept that
we have duties to obey the law in general, there are special reasons for doubting
that we have obligations to comply with immigration law in particular. The
injustice of immigration restrictions either silences or undercuts citizens’ obliga-
tions to obey immigration law. To explain why, I will now show that prominent
theories of political obligation are unable to explain why we are obligated to
obey immigration law.13
Let’s start with fair play theories of political obligation. Fair play theories of
political obligation hold that citizens have obligations to obey the law in virtue
of the fact that the law benefits these citizens. If a system of laws benefits
citizens in a fair way, then the citizens have duties to bear their fair share of
the costs of upholding this system, which requires citizens to comply with the
13 This section draws on arguments that I have defended at length elsewhere (Hidalgo 2015,
pp. 11-17).
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law (Dagger 1997, chapter 5). But defenders of fair play accounts of political
obligation argue that political obligations are conditional on whether a system
of law is fair. After all, duties of fair play are grounded in the fairness of
cooperative schemes. For example, it seems false that white citizens of South
Africa were under duties of fair play to comply with laws that enforced apartheid
even if these citizens benefited from these laws. This is so because these laws
were egregiously unfair. When is a system of law fair? George Klosko, a promi-
nent defender of a fair play theory of political obligation, claims that citizens
only have obligations of fair play to contribute to a cooperative scheme if the
benefits and burdens of this scheme are fairly distributed (2008, p. 6).
If the revisionary view is correct, then the benefits and burdens of states’
cooperative schemes are massively unfair. States unjustly deny foreigners many
of the rights and benefits that they are owed. If foreigners have rights to
immigrate to a state, then these foreigners have rights to access and benefit
from at least some of this state’s institutions, such as the labor market, the court
system, police protection, and other institutions. Immigration restrictions
infringe on foreigners’ rights to access a state’s territory and benefit from this
state’s institutions. In this sense, immigration restrictions deny foreigners a fair
share of the benefits of states’ cooperative schemes. The unfairness of a coop-
erative scheme releases us from our obligations to contribute to this scheme or,
at least, substantially weakens these obligations. So, it is plausible that the
unfairness of immigration laws undercuts citizens’ obligations of fair play to
obey them.
Some philosophers contend that natural duties can explain why we should
obey the law. Natural duties are duties that we owe to other people irrespective of
our relationships or interactions with them. John Rawls argues that we have natural
duties to comply with and support just institutions (1999/1971, ch. 6). Moreover,
Rawls claims that natural duties can explain why we should obey the laws of a
reasonably just regime. Rawls writes: “our natural duty to uphold just institutions
binds us to comply with unjust laws and policies, or at least not to oppose them by
illegal means as long as they do not exceed certain limits of injustice” (1999/1971,
p. 308).14 Why is this? Rawls says that, if people feel free to disobey unjust laws,
this will erode trust and confidence in reasonably just institutions. Christopher
Wellman similarly claims that, when we disobey unjust laws, we also undermine
the capacity of a state to enforce justified laws and this is a reason to refrain from
violating the law (Wellman and Simmons 2005, pp. 81–4).
14 But Rawls claims that duty to obey the law only applies when the basic structure of a society
is sufficiently just.
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But it is an empirical question whether disobedience to the law undermines
just institutions. Wellman and Rawls advance one empirical hypothesis: disobe-
dience to unjust laws undermines support for or the stability of legitimate
regimes. While this is possible, we can’t just assume that disobedience to unjust
laws has this effect in general. For one thing, some forms of disobedience are
unlikely to have any effects on legitimate institutions. Suppose that a landlord
rents to unauthorized migrants in secret despite the fact that the law forbids her
from doing so. No one else finds out about this violation of the law and the
actions of the landlord don’t have any discernable effects on the political
institutions of her state. Natural duties fail to condemn the landlord’s actions,
as it is false that her disobedience has negative impacts on legitimate institu-
tions. Perhaps disobedience to immigration law sometimes has negative effects
on legitimate or reasonably just political institutions (although, again, one
would need evidence to support this claim). Yet it is also plausible that disobey-
ing interaction restrictions often advances justice on balance by helping to
protect the rights of unauthorized migrants. When disobedience to the law
promotes justice on balance, natural duties give us no reason to comply with
these laws.15
Other theories of political obligations hold that citizens have duties to
comply with the law because democratic procedures authorized these laws.
One version of this argument is epistemic. This argument says that democratic
procedures are reliable in that they tend to authorize justified laws. On this
argument, there is a division of moral labor in that democratic governments may
do better at determining which laws are justified than individual citizens.
Consider an analogy with the criminal justice system. We condemn vigilantes
in part because individual vigilantes are likely to be less reliable at determining
15 An objector might argue that, even if immigration restrictions are generally unjust, employ-
ers cannot hire unauthorized migrants on fair terms in the real world. Employers who hire
unauthorized migrants may be unable to avoid unfairly dodging taxation and they employ
workers who might lack the right to unionize. So, employers who hire unauthorized migrants
take advantage of injustice and may perpetuate other injustices. But it is false that employers
who hire unauthorized migrants necessarily evade taxes or prevent their workers from union-
izing. For example, unauthorized migrants represent a growing fraction of the unionized work-
force in the United States (Milkman 2011) and employers often do pay taxes on the labor of these
migrants (Lipman 2006). Yet suppose that it is infeasible for employers to hire unauthorized
migrants without flouting some justified employment laws or contributing to injustices in other
ways. Now we must balance injustices. On the one hand, it may be pro tanto impermissible to
violate justified employment laws. On the other hand, it also appears wrong to contribute to
violating unauthorized migrants’ rights to occupational freedom. It seems to me that the moral
reasons to refrain from violating the rights of unauthorized migrants can defeat the reasons to
comply with justified employment laws.
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the guilt of criminals than criminal courts that have elaborate procedures for
delivering reliable verdicts. So, we should defer to criminal courts in order to
punish criminals rather than relying on our own individual judgments, even if
we have good grounds for doubting the justice of state punishment in particular
cases. Some philosophers argue that we can develop a similar case for the
authority of democratic governments (Estlund 2007). Democratic procedures
may be more reliable on the whole than individuals and this fact gives us
reasons to defer to the outcomes of these procedures.
Whatever the merits of this epistemic argument for authority in general, it is
doubtful that it applies to immigration law. One reason for questioning this
argument is straightforward. Democracies exclude most of the beneficiaries of
immigration – foreigners – from political power. Historical experience suggests
that democratic procedures are disposed to neglect the rights and interests of
people who lack influence in these procedures. For example, it is plausible that
democratic regimes that have excluded certain minority groups from the fran-
chise have been more prone to enforce unjust laws with respect to these groups.
The same point may apply to other vulnerable groups that are excluded from
political power, such as children and future generations. If foreigners are unable
to influence democratic procedures, then these procedures will likely fail to give
adequate weight to the interests of foreigners. We should therefore expect demo-
cratic procedures to be less reliable with respect to immigration than they are in
other domains. If democratic procedures are unreliable with respect to immigra-
tion law, then we lack reasons to defer to these procedures in this domain.
Other theories of democratic authority are proceduralist. These theories of
democratic authority say that citizens are obligated to comply with the outcomes
of democratic procedures in virtue of the fact that these procedures instantiate
valuable properties. Thomas Christiano (2008) has developed an influential
version of this view. Christiano argues that democratic procedures publicly
express the equality of citizens and this property justifies an obligation to
comply with the laws that this procedure authorizes. Democratic procedures
institutionalize the moral requirement to treat one’s fellow citizens with equal
respect and we satisfy this obligation by obeying the directives of these proce-
dures. In other words, we show our fellow citizens respect by complying with
laws that are generated by democratic procedures.
But theorists of democratic authority recognize that democratic authority
has limits. The authority of democratic procedures flows from the requirement to
treat people with equal consideration and respect. Yet states that violate liberal
rights treat their citizens with disregard and disrespect. For this reason,
Christiano claims that a democratic assembly that authorizes the violation of
liberal rights undercuts its own authority and releases citizens from duties to
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comply with its directives. Advocates of open borders argue that freedom of
movement, including the freedom to immigrate, is a human right or, at least, an
important liberty that is morally on par with other core liberal freedoms. If the
right to immigrate is a human right or basic liberty, then democratic procedures
express disrespect and disregard for people by significantly restricting immigra-
tion. There are resources internal to Christiano’s account for arriving at this
conclusion. Christiano says that basic liberal rights include freedom of occupa-
tion and “all the freedoms connected with freedom of association” (2008,
p. 144). As I have noted, immigration restrictions infringe on freedom of associa-
tion and occupational freedom and, of course, the same is true of interaction
restrictions. If democratic procedures fail to impose political obligations on
people when these procedures violate important rights, then democratic assem-
blies lack the power to impose political obligations on citizens to comply with
interaction restrictions.
It is possible that there is some other theory of political obligation that I
have neglected to discuss that can show that citizens have obligations to obey
immigration law. But this survey of theories of political obligation gives us
reason to conclude that citizens lack weighty obligations to obey immigration
laws. The injustice of immigration restrictions seems to silence or undercut
political obligations. If that’s the case, then political obligations fail to weigh
against our moral reasons to disobey interaction restrictions. At least, these
political obligations are likely to be weak and easily overridden by our counter-
vailing reasons to avoid contributing to violating the rights of other people.16
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that we have duties to disobey immigration laws. If
justice requires open borders, then states are systematically enforcing unjust
16 Someone might also object to my position by arguing that people can only permissibly
violate the law if they satisfy the conditions of civil disobedience, such as publicity, conscien-
tiousness, willingness to accept punishment, and so on. In contrast, I think that it is permissible
to covertly break unjust laws and evade punishment for them. While I am unable to defend this
view here, I am skeptical that the conditions of traditional civil disobedience are necessary
conditions for the permissibility of breaking unjust laws. For arguments that disobedience to the
law can be permissible even if it fails to satisfy the conditions of traditional civil disobedience,
see: A. John Simmons (2003) and Huemer (2012, pp. 164–6). Henry Thoreau, Mohandas Gandhi,
and other paragons of civil disobedience may have also rejected the view that law-breaking is
only justified if disobedients willingly accept punishment and demonstrate fidelity to the law.
For evidence of this possibility, see Lyons (1998).
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immigration laws. States try to compel citizens to share complicity in the
injustice of immigration restrictions. To avoid complicity in wrongdoing, citizens
are obligated to violate immigration laws. Furthermore, citizens’ moral reasons
to refrain from contributing to violating the rights of foreigners are, in general,
undefeated by countervailing considerations. Therefore, citizens are often
morally required to disobey immigration laws.
I have, in this way, answered the question of whether the ideal of open
borders affects the obligations of individuals that I posed in the introduction of
this paper. Perhaps a policy of open borders is infeasible and it is unlikely that
states will abolish their immigration restrictions in the near term. Nonetheless,
the ideal of open borders matters for individual action. In his famous essay on
civil disobedience, Henry Thoreau claimed that we have duties to disobey unjust
laws. Thoreau argued that, if “the machine of government…requires you to be
the agent of injustice to another, then, I say, break the law. Let your life be a
counter-friction to stop the machine. What I have to do is to see, at any rate, that
I do not lend myself to the wrong which I condemn” (2004/1849, pp. 315–16).
I have similarly argued that citizens must refuse to lend themselves to the wrong
that advocates of the revisionary view condemn. Our lives should be counter-
frictions to the injustice of immigration restrictions.
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